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Abstract 
We investigate the matching algorithm used by the German central clearinghouse for 
university admissions (ZVS) in medicine and related subjects. This mechanism 
consists of three procedures based on final grades from school 
(“Abiturbestenverfahren”, “Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen”) and on waiting time 
(“Wartezeitverfahren”). While these procedures differ in the criteria applied for 
admission they all make use of priority matching. In priority matching schemes, it is 
not a dominant strategy for students to submit their true preferences. Thus, strategic 
behaviour is expected. Using the full data set of applicants, we are able to detect 
some amount of strategic behaviour which can lead to inefficient matching. 
Alternative ways to organize the market are briefly discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The German system of university admissions is characterized by the coexistence of two 
diametrically opposed mechanisms. For the majority of subjects, universities decentrally 
select the students themselves. However, in six subjects there is a centralised matching 
scheme that is administered by the clearing house ZVS (Zentralstelle für die Vergabe von 
Studienplätzen). This coexistence provides the opportunity to study the advantages and 
shortcomings of both systems at the same time.  
In this paper we take a closer look at the centralised matching scheme that is currently 
employed in Germany.4 While the German case is of some stand-alone interest for policy 
makers in Germany, central clearinghouses for university admissions also exist in other 
countries (e.g. Turkey, Sweden, the Netherlands, United Kingdom). Our analysis can thus be 
understood as a contribution to the reform process that the university admissions system is 
undergoing in many countries.  
To investigate the efficiency of the current matching mechanism, we first show that it is not 
strategy-proof, i.e., revealing one’s true preferences is not a dominant strategy. Then, we 
study whether the preference lists submitted by students reflect their true preferences or, 
alternatively, whether students submit manipulated lists for strategic reasons. The rationale 
for focusing on strategic behaviour is that it can lead to inefficient matching.5
Centralized matching algorithms are useful to study even if no centralised mechanism is 
used. To see this, consider the recent experience in Germany. After many years of 
centralised admissions through the ZVS, universities were granted more rights in selecting 
their students in 2005. This has been advocated by many, and is an important step towards 
more competition among German universities.6 Although long awaited, the experience with 
decentralised admissions has been disillusioning in some respects. The new freedom has 
led to a number of problems that are typical for decentralised matching markets. Every year 
more than 300 000 applicants have to be handled by the not yet professionalized admissions 
offices of the universities. In addition, most students send their applications to a number of 
universities. After being admitted to some of them, students do not immediately reject their 
less preferred offers. Thus, universities get rejections rather late and then have to send out 
offers again. Many students are accepted only when the first term is already well under way.7  
                                                 
4 The rules of the matching scheme have often changed in the past. We chose to focus on the rules used in 2006 
which is the most recent year of our dataset. 
5 See Ergin and Sönmez (2006) for an analysis of the “Boston mechanism” which shares central features with the 
mechanism used by the ZVS. 
6 E.g. the German Scientific Council (Wissenschaftsrat), an advisory board to the German Federal government 
and federal states, in its statement on the reform of university admissions in Germany (2004),  stipulates that 
universities become more active in the admissions process to ensure a better match between the qualifications of 
applicants and the specific requirements of the programs (p.49). 
7 This problem has received wide coverage in the press. See e.g. Spiegel special, 24.4.2007, Nr. 2, or 
UniSPIEGEL 5/2007.  
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In addition, the universities often cannot fill all their spaces.8 These are typical symptoms of a 
congested market where universities find that they do not have sufficient time to make all 
offers they would like to make. Many universities are already reacting to this problem by 
moving application deadlines to earlier dates. This unravelling process implies earlier and 
more dispersed offers, which creates other inefficiencies.  
In the light of this experience and of the study of other matching markets, the usefulness of a 
well-designed central clearinghouse is evident. It can serve as an instrument to generate an 
efficient and stable matching, based on the preferences of universities and students. Thus, it 
is by no means necessary to move from a centralised to a decentralised system in order to 
strengthen the role of the universities in the admissions process. To the contrary, a well 
designed central mechanism can be a helpful tool for universities to be able to admit their 
most preferred students.  
Of course, markets do not have to be organized through a central clearinghouse. But the 
study of matching algorithms, and in particular the deferred acceptance algorithm (Gale and 
Shapley 1962), has led to insights about what is necessary to avoid congestion, instability, 
unravelling etc. Attempts to deal with these problems can be observed in many decentralised 
markets such as Undergraduate College Admissions as well as Graduate School Admissions 
in the US. In these markets, central institutions attempt to regulate, e.g., application 
deadlines, the possibility to make exploding offers (i.e. offers with a short deadline for 
acceptance) or the possibility to force students to make binding acceptances early.9  
The new initiative of the German KMK (the group of ministers of education from the federal 
states) to use the ZVS as a central platform for the admission process is a step into this 
direction.10,11 The plan is to assign the ZVS a service function within a decentralised 
admission process. The board of ministers recommends to the universities the conferral of all 
administrative tasks within the admission process on the ZVS. The idea is that the ZVS will 
then be in the position to speed up the admission process: If an applicant accepts an offer, 
this will lead to an immediate rejection of potential other offers. Hence, the advantage of such 
a moderated decentralised admission is that rejected slots can instantaneously be offered to 
someone else. Notice, however, that the process leading to an efficient match is rather 
complex. It is not sufficient to use the ZVS as a central platform to secure timely rejections 
after a student has accepted an offer. For example, to achieve an optimal matching it must 
be possible for universities to make second and later round offers. And if a student has 
received a preferred offer later (because his preferred university was rejected by an applicant 
                                                 
8 See Die Zeit 11/2007, p.39, UniSPIEGEL 5/2007 or Der Tagesspiegel Nr. 19476, 02.03.2007, p.3. 
9 See Avery, Fairbanks and Zeckhauser (2003) for a thorough analysis of College Admissions in the United 
States.  
10 See Handelsblatt Nr.043, 01.03.07, Tagesspiegel Nr.19474, 28.02.07 and Nr.19476, 02.03.07. 
11 Also the Wissenschaftsrat (2004) has proposed to reorganise the ZVS according to the British Universities and 
Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS), see p.51-52. 
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in the first round) he should be able to reject the offer he had first accepted and accept this 
new offer instead.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe the rules currently 
applied by the ZVS and analyze the incentives of applicants to misrepresent their true 
preferences. In Section 3, we describe the dataset used, and in Section 4 we employ various 
tests designed to understand whether subjects do indeed behave strategically. In Section 5 
we discuss policy issues and briefly sketch an alternative matching mechanism, the deferred 
acceptance algorithm. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The Student Mechanism 
 
In Germany, admission to university for all medical subjects is centrally administered. 
Nationwide all prospective students of biology, medicine, pharmacy, psychology, animal 
health and dentistry have to apply at the ZVS.12
The ZVS assigns students according to the following three procedures: 
1. Abiturbestenverfahren (procedure for those who are top of class). Around 20% of all 
seats are supposed to be allocated through the Abiturbestenverfahren  [ABV]. 
2. Wartezeitverfahren (quota for those who have been waiting for some time). Around 
20% of all seats are supposed to be allocated through the Wartezeitverfahren  [WZV]. 
3. Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen (selection procedure of universities). Around 60% 
of all seats are supposed to be allocated through the Auswahlverfahren der Hoch-
schulen [ADH]. 
For each of these procedures, applicants are asked to submit a preference ranking of 
universities. They are allowed to rank no more than six universities. Only in the WZV they 
have the option to add all other universities to the bottom of their list without ranking them. 
 
Universities do not submit preferences for individual students. Rather, the allocation rule in 
the ABV and WZV assumes that students who rank a university higher are preferred to 
students who rank it lower on their preference list. For students with the same rank, other 
criteria (e.g. final grades in the ABV or social factors in the WZV) are used to break ties.13
                                                 
12 In the past, every federal state had different regulations concerning admission to university. This led to juridical 
insecurity and to the so-called “Numerus-clausus” decisiongment of the Federal Constitutional Court. Due to the 
necessity of concerted criteria and a central service admitting applicants to university, the federal states founded 
the ZVS in the "Staatsvertrag über die Vergabe von Studienplätzen" on 20th of October in 1972 (ZVS 1998). 
Today, the ZVS has the mission to admit applicants, to support universities in selecting their students and to 
establish uniform criteria for the determination of the number of admitted applicants. 
13 These rules can either be interpreted as representing the preferences of the universities or as mere devices to 
allocate scarce seats. In the first case, it is a two-sided game with universities and students as players while in the 
second case we have a one-sided clearing house with only the students as players. See Abdulkadiroglu et al. 
(2005, 2006).  
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All of the three procedures are two-stage procedures. At the first stage, applicants are 
selected (“selection”). At the second stage, the selected applicants compete for admission to 
one of their preferred universities (“admission”). While the sequence is identical in the three 
procedures, they differ concerning the criteria applied. All three procedures and the optimal 
application strategies of students will be described in more detail in the following. 
After having administered all three procedures, the ZVS publishes detailed information on the 
application characteristics of admitted candidates for every university-subject combination. 
This includes average grades, waiting times and social criteria. Hence students applying with 
the ZVS can learn about the popularity of the different subjects and universities and about 
their chances of being admitted at a specific university within the different procedures. We 
therefore suspect that at least some applicants take this information about the past into 
account and compare their characteristics to historical thresholds. This helps them to make 
the right strategic choices. 
 
2.1 Abiturbestenverfahren (ABV) 
The ABV rewards excellent average grades in the Abitur (final grades from school). 
Therefore, those applicants with the best average grades are selected at the first stage.14 
Whether an applicant is selected or not only depends on his characteristics, i.e. the final 
grade in the Abitur and possibly on subordinated criteria.15 It cannot be influenced by his 
stated preferences. That is why we will concentrate on the second stage at which selected 
applicants compete for admission to one of their preferred universities and where stated 
preferences matter: First, a candidate’s first preference is considered. If there are more 
applicants for this university than can be assigned, those with the best average grades are 
admitted. Social criteria and (subordinately) lotteries are used to break ties. Once all first 
preferences have been considered, remaining applicants are admitted according to their 
second preference – if there are still seats left after the first round. 
 
The admission algorithm of the ABV can be generalised as follows: 
 
Step 1: In step 1 only the 1st preferences of the applicants are considered. For each 
university, admit the selected applicants who have ranked it as their 1st choice until there are 
no seats left or until all candidates ranking the university as their 1st choice have been 
                                                 
14 Due to the federal structure of the German educational system, every federal state in Germany has its own 
Abitur with its particular combination of subjects and grading system. In order to guarantee equal chances of 
admission to universities in spite of this federal school system, competition for admission is not nationwide but 
takes place only among applicants who have passed their Abitur in the same federal state. A detailed description 
for this can be found in Braun and Dwenger (2007). 
15 Subordinate criteria for selection are waiting time for being admitted, service and lottery. 
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admitted. If there are more candidates giving priority to a university than can be admitted, 
those applicants with the best grades in the Abitur are admitted. 
 
Step k: In step k only the kth preference of the still unassigned applicants is considered. For 
each university with available seats admit the selected applicants who have ranked it as their 
kth choice until there are no seats left or until all candidates ranking the university as their kth 
choice have been admitted. If there are more candidates giving the rank k to a university 
than can be admitted, those applicants with the best grades in the Abitur are admitted. 
 
The algorithm stops after step k when every selected applicant is assigned or when all k 
preferences have been considered. This means that some applicants may have been 
selected but remain unassigned even though there are still open seats at some universities. 
This is the case when universities with open seats have not been listed by the unmatched 
applicants. 
Let us assume that there are four universities U={u1,u2,u3,u4} where n={1,1,2,1} is the 
respective number of available seats. Every university u prefers applicants who rank 
university u higher to applicants ranking it lower. Furthermore, universities use average 
grades to break the ties among students who have given it the same rank.  
The set of selected applicants consists of A={a1,a2,a3,a4,a5} and their respective average 
grades are denoted by g. For simplification reasons let us assume that students are allowed 
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Step 1: In step 1 only the first preference of the applicants is considered. Applicant a2 is 
assigned to university u1. Applicant a1 receives an offer from university u2. Applicants a3, a4 
and a5 cannot be admitted in the first step. 
 
Step 2: As applicants a3, a4 and a5 are still unassigned, their second preference is 
considered. While applicant a4 can be admitted to university u3, applicants a3 and a5 are still 
left without an offer after round 2: all spaces have already been taken at their second 
preferred university (u2). 
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Step 3: Applicants a3 and a5 are still unassigned and hence their third preference is 
considered. Applicant a5 can be admitted to university u3. Applicant a3 by contrast, cannot be 
admitted. He remains unassigned even though there is one seat left at university u4. 
 
In our example it becomes clear that applicants have an incentive to misrepresent their 
preferences. Applicant a3, for instance, could have obtained an offer. He could have been 
assigned to his second preferred university by changing his (stated) university ranking: A 
space at university u2 would have been secured by stating this university as the most 
preferred one. 
Hence, the student mechanism in the ABV is not strategy-proof. It is not a dominant 
strategy to state one’s preferences truthfully. This is not per se problematic. We only have to 
worry when applicants’ strategies influence the matching outcome. Unfortunately, this is true 
for the allocation mechanism. In the ABV (and in the WZV, too, as we will see in the 
following), an applicant ranking a university on kth position is admitted before applicants 
ranking a university on (k+1)th position are considered – independently of her qualification. 
Average grades and social criteria are only used as tie-breakers among those applicants 
who have given it the same rank. Hence, the ranking decision can be decisive for the 
success of an applicant, and it may be advantageous to manipulate one’s true preference 
ordering. 
In a leaflet, the central clearing house (ZVS) points out that the chances of being admitted 
depend on the rank-order submitted:16
“If you could not be admitted to your top university, the ZVS considers your second preferred 
university. However, at this university priority is given to all those applicants who top-ranked 
this university. This means that your chances of being admitted at a lower ranked university 
are worsened depending on the overall demand.” 
 
 
2.2 Wartezeitverfahren (WZV) 
The WZV rewards the number of terms an applicant has been waiting for admission since 
the Abitur.17
First, applicants are selected depending on their waiting time (selection). At the second 
stage, admission is organized similarly as in the ABV. The admission process follows the 
preferences that have been stated by the applicants. Differences between ABV and WZV are 
due to the criteria applied to break the ties between applicants giving the same rank to a 
university that does not have enough seats left to admit all of its applicants. In the WZV, 
emphasis is put on social criteria. By this means, students are priority ordered in the 
following way: 
                                                 
16 ZVS (2006a). Translated by the authors. 
17 Note that years of study are not accepted as waiting time. 
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1. Severely disabled applicants, 
2. applicants with spouse/child having their main residence next to the wanted 
university, 
3. applicants with especially mandatory links to the top-ranked university town, 
4. applicants registered at their parents’ / foster parents’ house and who want to study at 
the closest university, 
5. other applicants. 
Average grade and (subordinately) lotteries are used to break the ties within each group. 
Once all first preferences have been considered, remaining applicants are admitted 
according to their second preference – if there are still seats left after the first round. This 
implies that the procedure in the WZV is not strategy-proof either. As applicants 
endogenously determine their rivals’ chances of being admitted, strategic behaviour pays 
out. 
Hence, stated preferences do matter in the WZV. The ZVS indirectly advises some strategic 
behaviour:18
“In practice, some universities are regularly over-demanded. That is to say a large number of 
applicants want to study at a famous university or in an attractive university town. Many 
applicants therefore state one of these universities as their first preference even though this 
university is not the nearest one offering the desired subject; in this case these applicants are 
of priority order 5 for universities which are far away. This means that a large number of 
applicants living with their own family or with their parents and having stated the nearest 
university will be considered with priority. Most applicants have little chance to be admitted 
outside their catchment area.” 
 
To see why the manipulation of preference lists can lead to inefficient outcomes, consider an 
example.19 For a given subject (e.g. medicine), there are three universities A, B, and C. Each 
of them has 100 slots and 100 students in its vicinity for whom the university is the closest 
university offering medicine. Assume that none of the applicants fulfils social criteria 1 to 3, 
such that criterion 4, i.e. living close to the university, becomes decisive. Suppose that 
university C is the least preferred university from the perspective of all students. In every 
area, 50 students prefer university A over B and 50 students prefer university B over A.  
Consider a student who lives in the vicinity of university A, but who prefers B over A. If she 
lists B first on her list, she loses priority at A. Thus, if she does not get a seat at university B, 
it will be difficult to get a seat at A, and she will possibly end up at C. The safe strategy in this 
situation is to rank A first where the student has priority. Notice that the more students from 
area B rank university B first, the more advisable it becomes for the student living in A not to 
list B first, but play safe and choose A. It is an equilibrium in the WZV for each student to list 
her home university first. In this equilibrium, every student is assigned to her home university. 
                                                 
18 ZVS (2006b), p.3. Translated by the authors. 
19 See Ergin and Sönmez (2006). 
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But in our example, it is possible to allocate all students living in the vicinity of university A or 
B to their first choice. Thus, all students who prefer university A but live in the area of B are 
offered a seat at A, and conversely, all students who prefer university B but live in area A are 
offered a seat at B. This allocation Pareto-dominates the allocation where every student is 
assigned to her home university as it increases the welfare of some students while leaving 
the welfare of others unchanged.   
 
2.3 Auswahlverfahren der Hochschulen (ADH) 
The ADH guarantees German universities to select most of their students according to a 
mixture of their own criteria and the average grade in the Abitur. 
In the ADH universities may preselect their applicants before deciding about admission.20 For 
this preselection, a mixture of different criteria is applied, which potentially includes the 
preference rank the applicant has given to the university.21 After the preselection stage, 
which universities can delegate to the ZVS if they want to do so, universities decide over the 
preselected applicants. Unlike in the ABV and the WZV, strategic choices can mainly be 
expected in the (pre)selection process (1st step), not in the admission process (2nd step). This 
is due to two features of the procedure: First, some universities only preselect those students 
who give the university top priority. Second, applicants are allowed to renew their preference 
ordering for the universities they have been preselected for, once preselection is 
accomplished. This means that students may give first priority to a university only for being 
preselected – and then move the university down on the list before admission takes place.22 
This sort of strategic behaviour can be illustrated by an example taken directly from the 
official ZVS brochure:23
“University “A” determines that only those applicants are preselected who have an average 
grade of 2.5 or better and who give top priority to university “A”. Admission is therefore 
excluded if you rank this university as your second or third choice – even if you have an 
average grade of 1.0! 
Once preselection is accomplished (…) applicants have the chance to re-order the 
preference ranking of the universities they have been selected for. (…) It turned out that 
applicant Antje K. has been preselected for her first, second and fifth preferred universities. 
As she had only given top priority to university “A” for being preselected, she had had to rank 
her truly desired top university “B” as second preference. Now she can rearrange her 
preference ordering. Antje K. now puts university “B” as first and university “A” as second 
preference. University E (originally her fifth choice) moves forward to rank three.” 
                                                 
20 Note that unlike the selection process in the other two procedures preselection in the ADH is not compulsory for 
the universities. 
21 Other criteria that can be observed are: weighted average of grades which reflect necessary qualifications for 
the subject, result in a subject specific scholastic test, apprenticeship relevant in respect of content and other 
criteria that are permitted by federal state legislation.  
If preselection is delegated to the ZVS, the ZVS shortlists applicants by considering the preference rank the 
applicant has given to the university and the average grade in the Abitur. 
22 Admission takes place according to a bunch of criteria, where the average grade in the Abitur is predominant. 
Other criteria are: weighted average of those grades which reflect necessary qualifications for the subject, result 
in a subject specific scholastic aptitude test and apprenticeship relevant in respect of content. 
23 ZVS (2006), p.11. Translated by the authors. 
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2.4 Strategic behaviour due to the combination of the three procedures 
There may be some strategic behaviour caused by the interdependence of the three 
procedures described. The following sequence of the three procedures is used: First, the 
ABV is administered. Once applicants are admitted or rejected, the WZV takes place for 
those applicants who are still unassigned. Finally, those candidates who have not been 
admitted either through the ABV or through the WZV can participate in the ADH.  Figure 1 
illustrates the sequential ordering of the three procedures. As described above, there may 
remain seats untaken in the ABV if not all selected applicants can be admitted to one of their 













1st stage: preselection, 60 % 
1st stage: selection, 20 % 
1st stage: selection 
2nd stage: admission 
2nd stage: admission, (20+x) % 











Figure 1: Admission Procedures – Sequential Order and Percentage of Seats Allocated 
 
It is important to note that the procedures are not completely independent: Applicants who 
have been admitted in the ABV (or in the WZV) are not allowed to take part in the ADH. This 
means that applicants not only have to behave strategically within one procedure but also 
between the three procedures. This problem is especially severe for applicants with a very 
good grade in the Abitur. 
Let us exemplify this with Stefan who is top of his class. At first, he takes part in the ABV, 
where he is selected because of his excellent average grade. Stating his preferences for the 
ABV, his considerations are twofold. On the one hand, Stefan would like to be admitted in the 
ABV, in order to ensure that he will get admitted at all.24 On the other hand, Stefan knows 
                                                 
24 It is possible that very qualified students remain unassigned. An extreme case we found in the data is the 
following: A student with a final grade of 1.1 applies to study medicine. He is selected in the ABV, but does not 
receive his first choice university because the tie is at a final grade of 1.1 and social criterion 4 (living close to the 
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that he has a good chance of being admitted in the ADH because of his very good average 
grade. Thus, he does not want to be admitted through the ABV to a university that ranks 
lower in his preference list than a university he would be admitted to through the ADH. Thus, 
we anticipate that his stated preferences in the ABV contain more truthful preference 
revelation than without the second chance of the ADH in the sense that he can risk to rank 
only very popular universities. For the same reason, he might even prefer to submit a 
truncated list of preferences in the ABV if he thinks that he has a good chance to receive one 
of his first preferences through the ADH. I.e. he prefers not being admitted through the ABV 
to receiving a university that is rather low on his preference list. 
 
3. Description of the Data 
 
We have access to a database of the ZVS covering all applications for the winter term 
2006.25 The following six subjects are centrally administered and part of our dataset: biology, 
medicine, pharmacy, psychology, animal health and dentistry. The dataset records all 
information provided by the applicants. This includes data on individual characteristics such 
as age, sex, and the place of living. Applicants also report the average grade of their Abitur, 
their waiting time since completing secondary school, information on military or social 
services, and potentially social criteria important to the selection process. Furthermore, the 
database provides information on the type(s) of admission procedure a prospective student 
has participated in as well as his or her preferences concerning the subject and the place of 
study that have been stated for the different procedures. For each of the admission 
procedures, success or failure of the application is reported. Applicants that have been 
selected in the first stage of the selection procedure (but were not necessarily admitted) can 
be identified by applying the selection criteria made public by the ZVS (2006c). Additionally, 
we create a dummy for each stated preference indicating whether the applicant has chosen 
an over-demanded university for her or his subject of choice. 
Definition: A university is over-demanded for a given subject and within a given procedure 
if only selected applicants that have ranked the university as their first choice have a chance 
of being admitted.  
Note that whether or not a university is over-demanded may depend on both the subject 
considered and the admission procedure. Information about whether the university was over-
demanded for a certain subject in previous years is publicly available from the ZVS (2006c). 
                                                                                                                                                        
university town). As the student has not chosen his hometown university, he loses out in the social criteria and 
remains unassigned after the first round. His second and third choices are over-demanded. In the WZV, he is not 
selected as he has no waiting time. In the ADH, the four universities on his list select their students themselves, 
and the person does not get selected. As a result, this person does not get a seat at all. This student could have 
been assigned a seat at his second preferred university if he had submitted a list in the ABV with his second-
ranked university first.  
25 Individual data have been made anonymous. 
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After excluding those applicants who received their university entrance diploma not in 
Germany, we are left with a total number of 65,254 observations.26 Almost every applicant 
has submitted a preference list for each of the three procedures. In fact, 61,317 prospective 
students have chosen to take part in the ABV, 60,935 in the WZV and 62,758 have supplied 
a preference list for the ADH. 
For each application procedure the descriptive statistics in Table 1 contrast the 
characteristics of those applicants that have been selected at the first stage with those of the 
unsuccessful candidates.27 The results illustrate the different selection criteria applied in the 
three procedures. Applicants selected in the ABV have received extraordinarily good grades 
in their Abitur. While candidates successful in the ADH performed somewhat worse, they still 
distinguish themselves from the rejected applicants by their good final grades. On the 
contrary, students selected in the WZV are characterised by a relatively poor performance in 
school, but they all have been waiting for a long time. The table also shows that the largest 
share of applicants are potential medical students, and that subject preferences matter for 
the success probability of an application. 
 
 ABV WZV ADH 







Age (Years) 20.20 21.27 25.86 20.91 20.20 21.70 
Female .7236 .6723 .6142 .6743 .7068 .6592 
Grade 1.198 2.330 2.606 2.292 1.802 2.472 
Waiting Time 
(Semester) 
.6732 2.21 9.035 1.649 .7350 2.817 
 
Subject Preferences 
Biology .1371 .0778 .1755 .0653 .1925 .0316 
Medicine .4411 .4992 .4122 .5107 .3763 .5491 
Pharmacy .0944 .0574 .0945 .0531 .0974 .0435  
Psychology .1915 .2024 .2055 .1983 .2074 .1965 
Animal Health .0565 .0795 .0466 .0848 .0544 .0895 
Dentistry .0794 .0836 .0657 .0877 .0720 .0898 
N 3,274 58,043 6,024 54,911 17,470 45,288 
 




                                                 
26 In section 4.3 we make use of the fact that in the WZV the proximity of an applicants’ place of living to the 
preferred university is used as an (subordinated) admission criterion which may induce strategic behaviour. Since 
this criterion can – by definition – not be fulfilled by most foreigners, we have restricted the dataset as described. 
27 Since the preselection step is not obligatory in the ADH, the characteristics of accepted and rejected students 
are compared for this procedure. 
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4. Empirical Evidence of Strategic Behaviour 
 
As a first step towards evaluating the performance of the assignment mechanism, the stated 
and received preferences of the selected candidates can be compared. We can simply count 
the number of times where the first preference of an applicant is satisfied, the number of 
times the second preference is satisfied etc. Table 2 shows that in the ABV 58.33 % of the 
selected students are admitted to their first preference. In the WBV this percentage is 
somewhat higher at 61.80 %. Notice that the second to sixth preference are only rarely 
satisfied in both procedures. This is a direct effect of the assignment mechanism used by the 
ZVS which gives priority to those students who have listed a university as their first choice. 
However, stated and true preferences may not coincide, which greatly reduces the value of 
stated preferences as a measure of success.   
 
 ABV WZV 
 Number Per cent Number Per cent 
1st Preference 1,909 58.33 3,723 61.80 
2nd Preference 214 6.54 395 6.56 
3rd Preference 80 2.44 198 3.24 
4th Preference 54 1.65 114 1.89 
5th Preference 57 1.74 104 1.73 
6th Preference 27 0.82 61 1.01 
Other Preference - - 447 7.42 
Unassigned 933 28.48 982 16.30 
 3,274 100.0 6,024 100.0 
 
Table 2: Preference Received By Applicants Fulfilling Selection Criteria 
 
In what follows, we shed some light on the sources of preference misrepresentation and use 
the data to show that observed behaviour is consistent with the incentives to act strategically. 
The main difficulty for studying strategic behavior empirically is the unobservability of the 
students’ true preferences. We therefore have to use indirect measures to investigate 
whether students reveal their preferences truthfully or whether they behave strategically.28 In 
the following, three such indirect measures are presented. First, we argue that applicants 
have an incentive to truncate their preference lists in the ABV (but not in the WZV) and show 
that a number of selected students behave accordingly. Next, the observed instability of 
preferences across procedures provides further evidence for strategic behaviour in the 
application procedure. Finally, we exploit the fact that it is a (weakly) dominated strategy to 
state an over-demanded university at any preference rank other than the first one. A 
proportion of students takes this feature of the mechanism into account and adjusts their 
preference orderings strategically. 
                                                 
28 For a related analysis based on data from school choice in Boston see Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2006). 
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4.1 Truncated Preference Lists 
A considerable number of students remain unassigned in ABV and WZV, although they fulfil 
the selection criteria. This number is particularly high in the ABV where more than one 
quarter of the selected students are not admitted to any university. This observation is in line 
with the incentive to go for the top choice in the ABV and in case of no success hope to be 
admitted in the ADH. In fact, 716 (or 76.74 %) of the selected students who have remained 
unassigned in the ABV procedure have obtained their top choice in the ADH. 
Table 3 displays the percentage of students who list only one university, only two universities 
etc. in the ABV and in the WZV. Note that almost all students supply a preference list for the 
ABV and the WZV, even if their final Abitur grade is by far not good enough or even if the 
number of semesters they have waited will not be sufficient to be selected. The second and 
fourth columns show that the majority of students list all six universities. Even if all applicants 
are considered, significantly more prospective students truncate their preferences lists in the 
ABV. A t-test reveals that the difference is statistically significant at any conventional level 
However, we are mostly interested in behaviour of those students who are finally selected, 
i.e. those students who can expect to be assigned through the ABV or the WZV, respectively, 
and therefore try to make a smart choice when listing their preferences. In the ABV (third 
column) more than a quarter of the selected students only list one university. These students 
obviously understand that they should not try to get matched by all means in the ABV, but 
that they should rather try to get their top choice either through the ABV or through ADH. 
Now consider the last column in table 3 for those students who get selected in the WZV. The 
percentage of students listing only one university is much higher in the ABV than in the WZV. 
In the WZV no analogous incentive exists as in the ABV because the successfully selected 
students in the WZV usually have so poor grades that they have no chance of being admitted 
through the ADH. 
 












1 11.05 % 26.11 % 8.85 % 17.16 % 
2 6.11 % 9.65 % 4.07 % 6.51 % 
3 7.46 % 11.79 % 4.29 % 5.89 % 
4 5.52 % 8.03 % 2.62 % 3.20 % 
5 9.62 % 8.06 % 8.16 % 5.10 % 
6 60.23 % 36.35 % 72.01 % 62.13 % 
N 61,317 3,274 60,935 6,024 
 
Table 3: Number of Universities Ranked by Applicants 
 
The strategic choice to rank only one’s first preference(s) in the ABV has an important side-
effect. Around 28% of the slots the universities plan to fill through the ABV are not taken in 
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the ABV because certain universities do not get listed often enough by applicants. These 
slots are then filled through the WZV. This implies that some universities receive by far more 
than 20% of their students through the WZV. Thus, they admit weaker students due to the 
strategic choices in the ABV than if applicants submitted a complete list of their true 
preferences (if at least some of the true preference lists contain universities that are not over-
demanded). 
 
4.2 Stability of Preferences across Procedures 
If applicants revealed their preferences truthfully, stated preferences should not vary across 
the three procedures. However, the criteria employed by the ZVS to admit applicants differ 
between procedures and it can therefore pay off for an applicant to submit different 
preference lists. In particular, if there are too many applicants for one university who all 
satisfy the selection criterion, a number of social criteria are employed in the WZV. No such 
assignment rule exists in the ABV. Thus, we can ask whether these different selection criteria 
lead to differences in the preference listings. Similarly, the universities have their own criteria 
for the ADH which can slightly diverge from the criteria of the ABV. 
Table 4 reports the discrepancies between the preference lists applicants submit in the 
different procedures. Discrepancies at a certain preference rank can result either from 
naming different universities or from not stating a preference in one list but stating one in the 
other list. The results show that a considerable number of subjects submit different lists in the 
three procedures. This can be ascribed to strategic considerations. Furthermore, the 
consistency between stated preferences is generally higher for higher ranks of the 
preference list than for lower ranks, no matter which procedures are compared to each other. 
First, this is a logical consequence of the fact that certain changes like removing one 
university from the list automatically lead to changes at lower ranks. But it is also in line with 
the strategic incentives. Of course, subjects might already misrepresent their first choice in 
an attempt to get the preferred university for which the best shot is the first priority. But for 
later ranks, it is clear that additional strategic issues arise, e.g. because applicants have an 
incentive to truncate their list in the ABV but not in the WZV as argued above. Consistent 
with this, we find that for lower preference ranks the discrepancy between the lists increases 
to up to 58% 
In the ADH, applicants have the possibility to state a preference list for the preselection 
process at the first stage and, once preselected, to modify their preference ordering for 
admission. As we have shown earlier, strategic behaviour in the ADH is expected to take 
place at the first stage because some universities only preselect candidates top-ranking 
them. When comparing stated preferences for the preselection and admission process it is 
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evident that the majority of applicants understands this and rearranges preferences after 
being preselected.29
 ABV vs. WZV ABV vs. ADH WZV vs. ADH ADH: 
preselection vs. 
admission*)
1st Preference 24.43 % 26.90 % 31.15 % 61.29 % 
2nd Preference 32.87 % 38.46 % 42.75 % 76.48 % 
3rd Preference 37.55 % 43.25 % 48.09 % 85.39 % 
4th Preference 42.66 % 46.75 % 52.88 % 89.19 % 
5th Preference 45.49 % 47.24 % 55.05 % 93.67 % 
6th Preference 49.05 % 48.65 % 57.96 % 93.98 % 
*) As preselection in the ADH is only administered by the ZVS for a subgroup of universities, we do not have 
information on all applicants. Hence, in the third column we restrict our analysis to applicants for whom we have 
preference lists for both preselection and selection. There is no obvious reason why those universities relying on 
the ZVS for preselection differ from the other ones in a way that is related to our focus on strategic behaviour. 
  
Table 4: Discrepancy between Preference Lists 
 
Let us now turn to the WZV. The quantitatively most important (subordinated) criterion for 
admission is whether a student who is registered at his parents’ house applies to the closest 
university. While this information is not directly provided in the dataset, we can identify the 
university closest to the place of living of an applicant. We then compare the number of 
applicants in the two procedures listing the closest university. Strategic behaviour would lead 
to a higher number of such applications in the WZV than in the ABV.30 This is exactly what 
we observe (see Table 5) although at first glance the differences are not large.31 However, 
notice again that the difference is strongest among the selected applicants, i.e. the group of 
students with a real chance of being assigned in the respective procedure, ABV or WZV, 
and, hence, a strong motive to optimise their preference ordering. This finding is again 
consistent with a number of applicants choosing strategically.  
 1st Preference 2nd Preference 3rd Preference 
ABV 
All Applicants 52.07 % 16.65 % 8.50 % 
Grade ≤ 2.0 49.37 % 16.07 % 9.07 %  
Selected Applicants 49.88 % 14.77 % 8.94 % 
WZV 
All Applicants 53.33 % 17.09 % 8.60 % 
Waiting Time ≥ 6 63.49 % 18.73 % 7.62 % 
Selected Applicants 65.27 % 18.95 % 8.16 % 
 
Table 5: Fraction of Applicants with Preference for Closest University 
                                                 
29 Note, however, that some of the discrepancies reported here will not reflect strategic behaviour. In particular, 
prospective students who are not preselected for all of their stated choices are forced to change their preferences 
in the second step of the admission procedure. But as the criteria applied to preselect applicants are made public 
in advance and are not determined endogenously as the selection criteria in ABV and WZV, most applicants do 
not have to change their preference ordering for this reason.  
30 We implicitly assume here that applicants in the two procedures are alike with respect to their inclination to 
move away from their home town. 
31 The difference between the proportion of students choosing a home university as their first 
preference in the ABV and in the WZV is statistically significant even if all applicants are considered. 
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Finally, Table 6 displays the number of cases where students switch preferences from their 
home university (as defined above) to a university away from home or in the opposite 
direction in the ABV and WZV procedures. For this table we only look at applicants who state 
different preferences in the ABV and the WZV. Note that by analysing the behaviour of one 
candidate in different procedures we circumvent the problem that candidates selected in the 
two procedures may systematically differ from each other in terms of their mobility. 
Concerning the first preference, the number of cases where applicants switch their 
preference lists according to the strategic incentive, i.e. choosing their home university in the 
WZV and some other university in the ABV, is five percentage points higher as in the 
opposite direction. The difference is statistically significant, but relatively small. The small 
difference may have to do with the fact that only very few candidates have a chance to be 
admitted in both the ABV and the WZV (and, hence, have a motive to behave strategically in 
both procedures). When restricting the analysis to this group only, the gap indeed widens 
markedly to about 14 percentage points. Again, this shows that a number of applicants adjust 
their preference lists to the criteria used in the selection procedure and that preference lists 
cannot be taken to represent true preferences in all cases. 
 
 All Applicants Applicants with Grade ≤ 2.0 & 
Waiting Time ≥ 6 
 Number Per cent Number Per cent 
Away University 
ABV → Home 
University WZV 
2,256 27.19  35 34.65 
Home University 
ABV → Away 
University WZV 




4,207 50.70  45 44.55 
 8,298 100.0 101 100.0 
Home University: University is among the universities that are located closest to the place of living of an applicant. 
 
Table 6: Strategies of Applicants Changing their Preferences between ABV and WZV 
 
 
4.3 Strategic Preference Ordering 
Next, we exploit the fact that under the priority matching mechanism it is a (weakly) 
dominated strategy to state an over-demanded university at any preference rank other than 
the first one. The reason is the following: By the definition above, the number of applicants 
ranking an over-demanded university as their first choice exceeds its number of seats. Thus, 
it is never successful to rank this university second or lower. Consider two different possible 
strategies by the applicants. Under Strategy I we summarize all preference lists with an over-
demanded university as first and second preference. Strategy II covers all cases where an 
over-demanded university is ranked first, but a university that is not over-demanded is 
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ranked second. While the percentage of first preferences received is almost the same for 
both strategies, there is a notable difference for the second preference (see table 7). Both in 
the ABV and the WZV, Strategy I is never successful for the second preference, while more 
than a quarter of students receive their second preference if it is not over-demanded 
(Strategy II).32 These results are not surprising given the priority matching mechanism, but 
they show very clearly that listing an over-demanded university as second preference is 
(weakly) dominated. 
 
 ABV WZV 
 Strategy I Strategy II Strategy I Strategy II 
1st Preference 47.68 % 42.78 % 46.49 % 49.91 % 
2nd Preference 0.00 % 29.75 % 0.00 % 34.29 % 
3rd Preference 6.68 % 2.55 % 7.28 % 2.26 % 
4th Preference 4.87 % 0.99 % 4.44 % 0.78 % 
5th Preference 5.10 % 1.13 % 4.15 % 0.52 % 
6th Preference 2.38 % 0.42 % 2.37 % 0.43 % 
Other Pref. - - 17.34 % 3.13 % 
Unassigned 33.30 % 22.38 % 17.94 % 8.68 % 
N 883 706 1,794 1,152 
Strategy I: over-demanded university ranked as first and second choice  
Strategy II: over-demand university ranked as first, not over-demanded university as second choice 
Table 7: Preference Received by Strategies (Selected Applicants Only) 
 
We can now study whether applicants are aware of this property of the mechanism and 
adjust their preference lists accordingly. An interesting aspect in this regard is that the ZVS 
makes applicants aware of the fact that stating an over-demanded university as second or 
third choice never pays off. In an information brochure of the ZVS it reads:33
 
“Applicants with very good marks should not bet to become admitted at their preferred 
university at all costs. For instance, if there are 50 free seats at a university which is very 
popular and which has thus been ranked on position one by the student, 10 seats can be 
allocated by the ABV. If there are many applicants ranking this university at position one, 
only the ten best applicants will be admitted; this possibly means that not even all selected 
applicants stating this university as their first choice will be admitted. As a consequence of 
the described admission process by stated preferences, applicants stating this place of study 
as their second or third choice cannot be admitted all the less.” 
 
Do applicants behave accordingly? Consider first an example. In 2006, among all applicants 
for medicine in the ABV, 2,551 students listed the Charité in Berlin as their first preference. 
Only 812 listed it as their second preference and 776 as their third. As the Charité is over-
demanded, this drop between the first and the second preference on the list can be 
explained by strategic considerations. An alternative explanation is that preferences for the 
                                                 
32 Note that Strategy II is not necessarily successful for the second preference as this preference could be over-
demanded when applicants ranking it first and second are considered. 
33 ZVS (2006b), p.2. Translated by the authors. 
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Charité are by coincidence characterized by a large number of students whose first 
preference it is and a much smaller number of students with the Charité as their second or 
third preference. In order to test for this alternative explanation, we will now look at all 
universities. 
Table 8 presents the percentage of over-demanded universities at each rank of the 
preference list for both the ABV and WZV. First, notice that selected applicants choose over-
demanded universities more often than all applicants together. This effect is particularly 
strong in the ABV with 46.95 % of all applicants and 67.56 % of the selected applicants 
ranking an over-demanded university first. If the selected applicants are a random sample 
with regard to their preferences, then this hints at strategic considerations of the applicants 
who submit a list of preferences that depends on their own grade in the ABV. 
An alternative explanation would be that preferences of students vary systematically between 
talented and less talented students such that talented students prefer over-demanded 
(possibly more or less demanding) universities. However, given that the state exam is 
generally the same at all universities in medicine, pharmacy etc., there is no obvious reason 
why this should be the case. Still, we cannot exclude this alternative explanation and 
therefore only conclude that the observed pattern is consistent with subjects stating 
preferences strategically. 
 
 ABV WZV 




1st Preference 46.95 % 67.56 % 67.00 % 72.00 % 
2nd Preference 39.93 % 54.73 % 63.27 % 66.67 % 
3rd Preference 39.53 % 53.16 % 61.62 % 63.40 % 
4th Preference 40.56 % 50.38 % 59.11 % 59.93 % 
5th Preference 38.97 % 44.09 % 57.00% 57.53 % 
6th Preference 40.42 % 47.23 % 56.78 % 57.31 % 
Applicants who have ranked 6 universities 
1st Preference 44.44 % 67.56 % 64.20 % 69.33 % 
2nd Preference 37.98 % 55.97 % 60.04 % 64.71 % 
3rd Preference 37.67 % 54.12 % 58.84 % 61.31 % 
4th Preference 39.97 % 51.00 % 56.63 % 58.30 % 
5th Preference 39.71 % 46.39 % 56.74 % 58.06 % 
6th Preference 40.42 % 47.23 % 56.78 % 57.31 % 
 
Table 8: Fraction of Over-demanded Universities in Stated Preferences 
 
Table 8 also reveals that the selected applicants in both the ABV and the WZV choose an 
over-demanded university very often as their first preference. For the second preference 
there is a clear drop, e.g. from 67.56 % to 54.73 % in the ABV. The differences between 
second and third, third and fourth etc. are much smaller than the drop between first and 
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second preference.34 This is consistent with a proportion of students understanding that they 
should never rank over-demanded universities at the second to sixth place. 
An alternative approach to the question of how often over-demanded universities are ranked 
second or lower is to take every subject-university combination as a unit of observation. We 
do this in Table 9 which shows the average number of applications per university for a given 
subject that is either over-demanded (first column) or not over-demanded (second column) at 
the university considered. Over-demanded universities are ranked clearly more often as first 
preference than as second or third preference. In contrast, universities that are not over-
demanded are ranked about equally often as first and second preference. Again, if some 
students understand the sub-optimality of ranking an over-demanded university second or 
lower, this is the pattern that would result. 
 











1st Preference 475.68 356.39 458.81 326.51 
2nd Preference 354.33 365.10 389.90 337.07 
3rd Preference 320.81 331.80 363.26 334.08 
4th Preference 309.72 302.60 330.05 337.47 
5th Preference 282.74 283.23 318.99 327.54 
6th Preference 261.91 270.11 311.44 320.86 
All Preferences 2005.19 1909.23 2172.45 1983.54 
Observations 57 82 80 59 
The subject animal health was excluded since applicants can only chose between five 
universities. 
 
Table 9: Applications per University in a Given Subject 
 
The observation of a significant drop in the number of over-demanded universities ranked as 
first and second preference does not necessarily imply strategic behaviour. First, a university 
might receive a significantly larger number of applications ranking the university first than 
applications ranking it second because the university is over-demanded and, hence, 
prospective students understand the strategic advantage of giving it first priority. 
Alternatively, the observed drop may simply hint at a large number of applications ranking 
the university at position one, which, by definition, causes the university to be over-
demanded. In the following we will use instrumental variable regressions in order to analyse 
the issue of causality more thoroughly. The results for the ABV and the WZV are reported in 
tables 10a and 10b. 
                                                 
34 This observation also rules out that the observed drop simply results from the fact that once an over-demanded 
university is chosen at the first preference rank, the pool of over-demanded universities shrinks and, hence, the 
likelihood of choosing an over-demanded university at the second rank decreases as well. In particular, similar 
drops should then also be evident for ranks further down the list. Importantly, the pool of over-demanded 
universities is quite large. In fact, at about 41 % (57.6 %) of all university-subject combinations are over-
demanded in the ABV (WZV). Hence, even after choosing an over-demanded university the applicant is left with a 
considerable number of potential choices that are over-demanded as well. 
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The difference between the number of applications ranking university i for subject j at 
position k normalised by the total number of applications at the two adjacent ranks is used as 
the dependent variable. Accordingly, the variable to be explained is bounded by ± 1 and 
takes a value of 0 in case of a balanced number of applications at the two ranks considered. 
The normalisation ensures that the dependent variable is not influenced by the size of a 
university. Otherwise, we would risk biased estimates given that the probability of a university 
to be over-demanded may be related to its size. The dependent variable is regressed on a 
dummy indicating whether or not subject j is over-demanded at university i. Furthermore, a 
full set of subject dummies is included. 
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 (Prefijk - Prefijl) / (Prefijk + Prefijl) 
(k,l) (1,2) (2,3) (3,4) (4,5) (5,6) 
 
OLS Estimation 


















    .0612*** 
(.0177) 
Subject 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² .1287 .0171 .0301 .0453 .0275 
N 144 144 144 144 139 
 
2SLS Estimation 





















Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 122 122 122 122 118 
 
Diagnostic Tests (p-values) 
Overidentification .1070 .6430 .8893 .3162 .9810 
Endogeneity .1002 .9676 .2046 .6120 .2063 
F-Test of 
Instruments .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level. 
Prefijk: Number of Applications Ranking University i for subject j at position k. 
Standard errors, robust to heteroscedasticity and intra-group correlation, are reported in parentheses. 
The null hypothesis of the test of overidentifying restrictions (Sargan-Hansen test) is that the instruments are valid instruments. 
Under the null hypothesis of the endogeneity test the over-demand variable can actually be treated as exogenous. 
 
Table 10a: Preference Discontinuities - Regression Results, ABV  
 
We start with estimating our regression model by conventional OLS. As expected, the 
estimated coefficient of the dummy for over-demand is positive and highly statistically 
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significant in the regression on the difference between ranks 1 and 2. This applies to both 
application procedures but not to ranks further down the preference list.35
 
 Dependent Variable: 
 (Prefijk - Prefijl) / (Prefijk + Prefijl) 
(k,l) (1,2) (2,3) (3,4) (4,5) (5,6) 
 
OLS Estimation 





















Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² .0703 .0162 .0310 .0245 .0082 
N 144 144 144 144 139 
 
2SLS Estimation 





















Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 122 122 122 122 118 
 
Diagnostic Tests (p-values) 
Overidentification .5653 .0603 .9314 .5128 .7976 
Endogeneity .0580 .1203 .4890 .4982 .8444 
F-Test of 
Instruments .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 
***, **, *: statistically significant at the 1, 5, 10 percent level. 
Prefijk: Number of Applications Ranking University i for subject j at position k 
Standard errors, robust to heteroscedasticity and intra-group correlation, are reported in parentheses. 
The null hypothesis of the test of overidentifying restrictions (Sargan-Hansen test) is that the instruments are valid instruments. 
Under the null hypothesis of the endogeneity test the over-demanded variable can actually be treated as exogenous. 
 
Table 10b: Preference Discontinuities - Regression Results, WZV  
 
In a next step, we tackle the endogeneity issue by instrumenting the dummy for a university 
being over-demanded. A valid instrument should be correlated with the explanatory variable 
but uncorrelated with the error term. Three instruments are proposed that arguably fulfil 
these criteria. First, the average value of the over-demand dummy of university i in all 
subjects i ≠ j is used as an instrument for subject j at university i. Intuitively, universities that 
are very popular in a given subject should be more likely to be popular in the subject under 
consideration as well. For instance, knowing that biology at LMU Munich is in high demand 
should also reveal information about the popularity of the respective medical faculty since 
                                                 
35 The dummy is also significant at the 10 per cent level in the regression on the difference between ranks 3 and 4 
in the WZV. However, the coefficient is comparably small and no such effect is found for the other application 
procedure. 
 - 22 - 
common factors should affect demand for both subjects. However, being in over-demand for 
subject i should not have a direct effect on the difference between the number of applicants 
ranking a university as their first or as their second choice in subject j. 
As further instruments we utilise the (yearly) population growth of the city a university is 
located in and a dummy indicating a population size of above 500,000 inhabitants. Both 
variables are meant to proxy the attractiveness of the city environment, which is likely to play 
a major role in determining whether or not a subject at a university is over-demanded. 
Neither population growth nor population size should be directly related to our dependent 
variable. The lower part of tables 10a and 10b reports 2SLS estimation results. For both 
application procedures the dummy for over-demand still enters with a positive sign and is 
statistically significant in the regression on the difference between ranks 1 and 2. The point 
estimate of the dummy (but also the standard error) increases markedly for both procedures. 
Turning to the diagnostic tests, a standard Sargan-Hansen test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that our instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms and, hence, valid.36 
Moreover, in both estimations the instruments are jointly significant in the first step 
regression at any conventional significance levels. Thus, the instruments are indeed 
correlated with the endogenous variables thereby also fulfilling the second requirement for an 
instrumental variable. Since the 2SLS estimator is generally less efficient than its OLS 
counterpart, the latter is preferred over the former in the absence of an endogeneity problem. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the null hypothesis that the over-demand variable can actually be 
treated as exogenous could not be rejected for the ABV (p-value of 0.1002). The result 
indicates that it may not be necessary to resort to instrumental variable techniques. However, 
evidence for endogeneity is found in the estimation referring to the WZV. As anticipated, 
endogeneity is not an issue in the regressions involving ranks further down the preference 
list. 
In summary, the difference between the number of applicants ranking a university as their 
first or as their second choice is significantly higher when the corresponding subject is over-
demanded than when it is not over-demanded. This is consistent with applicants refraining 
from stating an over-demanded university second on their list, while it can be perfectly 
rational to state it as a first choice. Causation indeed seems to run from a university-subject 
combination being over-demanded to the corresponding (strategic) application behaviour. 
 
 
                                                 
36 In the estimation for the ABV (difference between rank 1 and 2) the p-value of the Sargan-Hansen test is 
0.1070 and, hence, close to the 10 per cent significance level. However, dropping the instrument for population 
size would increase the p-value considerably (0.2244) without changing the qualitative results. 
 - 23 - 
5.  Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks  
 
In summary, this paper shows that the allocation mechanism used in the German centralised 
university admission system is not strategy-proof. In fact, applicants may have an incentive 
to misrepresent their preferences. Using a comprehensive dataset of the ZVS, we have 
evidence that a sizable number of prospective students understand the mechanism and 
behave strategically when submitting their preference lists. First of all, the data is consistent 
with many students engaging in strategic preference ordering within the different procedures. 
Second, applicants truncate their preference lists in accordance with the incentive provided 
by the allocation procedures. Third, we have shown that preferences are not stable across 
procedures hinting again at some degree of strategic behaviour. Since strategic preference 
lists may imply inefficient matches, these results lead to the question of how the current 
mechanism could be improved.  We will sketch one small change of the current mechanism 
to illustrate how one of its shortcomings can be remedied. But we will also argue that a more 
fundamental change might be warranted in order to get rid of other more severe 
shortcomings of the mechanism. 
A simple change in the mechanism that could be advocated concerns the allocation of seats 
between the three procedures. Currently, unfilled spaces from the ABV are moved to the 
WZV. Due to strategic behaviour of applicants who truncate their preference lists in the ABV, 
this happens often. A simple measure to prevent the inflation of the number of spaces 
allocated through the WZV is to move open spaces from the ABV to the ADH instead. In this 
way, universities get students from the same pool as in the ABV, namely those students with 
good final grades. 
However, many problems of the current mechanism remain unsolved by minor changes of 
this kind. As we have shown the ZVS currently applies priority matching within each of the 
three procedures. Algorithms based on priority matching are generally prone to strategic 
preference manipulations and can thus lead to inefficient matchings.37 We will briefly sketch 
the Gale-Shapley mechanism which is central to the literature on matching algorithms. It was 
first described by Gale and Shapley (1962) although similar ideas had already been used 
since the 1950’s in the US clearinghouse for the first jobs of doctors.38 In the last years, the 
algorithm (with necessary adaptations to the special requirements of each market) has been 
implemented for example in central clearinghouses for admissions to high schools in New 
York City and to public schools in Boston as well as in the market for medical fellowships in 
the US and medical labour markets in Canada and Great Britain.39 The Gale-Shapley 
                                                 
37 See Roth (1991). 
38 See Roth (forthcoming). 
39 See Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, Roth (2005) as well as Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, Roth (2006) for NYC high school 
admissions and Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, Roth, Sönmez (2006) as well as Chen and Sönmez (2006) on the 
Boston public school system. For an overview see Niederle and Roth (2007).  
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mechanism can also be used to match students to universities. As several applicants are 
assigned to each university, the application procedure creates a many-to-one matching 
problem in a two-sided market. In a two-sided market, e.g. with students and universities, 
individuals on each side have preferences over those with whom they are matched and are 
(potentially) strategic agents.  
The Gale-Shapley student optimal mechanism selects the student optimal stable matching.40 
This deferred acceptance algorithm leads to a stable matching in the sense that everybody 
prefers his match over no match at all, and that there is no student and university who are 
not matched but who would both prefer to be. In addition, it is the mechanism that leads to 
the stable matching that is preferred to all other stable matchings by the students. This 
student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm works as follows: 
 
Step 1: Each applicant proposes to his 1st choice university. Each university tentatively 
assigns its seats to its proposers one at a time following their rank ordering. When all seats 
are taken, any remaining proposers are rejected. 
 
Step k: Each applicant who was rejected in the previous step proposes to his next choice. 
Each university considers the applicants it has been holding together with its new proposers 
and tentatively assigns its seats to these students one at a time, following its rank ordering. 
When all seats are taken, any remaining proposers are rejected.  
 
The algorithm terminates when no student proposal is rejected. Each student is assigned to 
his final tentative assignment. If a student is rejected by all universities to which he has 
applied, the student remains unassigned. 
 
What can be gained by adopting the Gale-Shapley student-optimal mechanism? Ergin and 
Sönmez (2006) point out the efficiency problems of a priority matching mechanism similar to 
the one used in the ABV and the WZV.41 They analyze the so-called Boston mechanism 
which shares the property of the ABV and the WZV at the admission stage that students who 
have ranked a school higher are strictly preferred by this school to students who have ranked 
it lower. In their paper, the equilibria of the Boston mechanism are compared to the outcome 
of the student-optimal stable mechanism, and it is shown that the outcome of the latter is 
equal to or Pareto dominates the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the Boston mechanism. 
Thus, a transition to the student-optimal mechanism can lead to significant efficiency gains. 
                                                 
40 Analogously, the Gale-Shapley college optimal mechanism selects the college optimal stable matching. 
41 See also Roth (1991) who shows that priority matching systems can produce unstable matchings and that it is 
not a dominant strategy to reveal one’s true preferences. 
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However, the Gale-Shapley student optimal mechanism requires a consolidated preference 
list on both sides of the market. This is simple for the applicants. If strategic behaviour does 
not pay out, applicants do not suffer from having to submit one single list (instead of three in 
the current mechanism). A single preference ordering for every university, however, is more 
difficult to realise: The current German system has a number of special features such as 
quotas for students with long waiting times. These priorities must be taken into account when 
reorganizing the system of university of admissions. On the basis of our analysis, we can 
only make some cautious first suggestions.  
1. Our data show that the ABV and the ADH procedures do not differ much in terms of the 
characteristics of students admitted through them. In fact, the majority of students selected 
but not admitted through the ABV get a seat through the ADH procedure. It therefore seems 
conceivable to merge these two procedures into one.42 Universities could submit preference 
lists that are either based on one single criterion (e.g. the final grade) or on their own set of 
criteria. Given also the preference lists of students, the Gale-Shapley student-optimal 
mechanism could then be applied to secure a stable matching that is optimal for students. 
This mechanism is strategy-proof for the students, and it is the only mechanism which 
combines a number of other desirable properties.43
2. We also see in our data that the groups of students admitted through ABV and ADH on the 
one hand and the WZV on the other hand are (almost) disjunct. This could be useful when 
considering maintaining two different procedures, each using the Galey-Shapley mechanism 
with one based on social criteria and the other based on academic achievement and 
preferences of the universities. Strategic considerations could be minimal due to the 
difference in focus groups, but this remains to be analyzed carefully.   
Of course, a change of the mechanism must be accompanied by a political discussion about 
the importance of the various criteria. On the other hand, we have shown that the present 
mechanism leads to preference manipulations, inducing an inefficient matching outcome. 
Thus, independently of the criteria applied, the current mechanism can be made more 
efficient. Finally, it should be mentioned that even though the current mechanism is not 
strategy-proof it is rather successful in filling all available seats compared to many non-
regulated decentralised markets. 
                                                 
42 This has also been suggested by the Wissenschaftsrat (2004) in a statement highlighting the important role of 
the final grade as a predictor of academic success.  After mentioning the possibility of allocating a number of slots 
directly to those with the best final grades (as in the ABV), it is explicitly mentioned that a combined procedure 
where the final grade plays a dominant role might be especially effective (p. 48).   
43 See Gale and Shapley (1962), Roth (1985), Roth and Sotomayor (1989). For the related student placement 
problem where the priority at schools is determined by e.g. exam scores see Roth (1982), Alcalde and Barberà 
(1994) as well as Balinski and Sönmez (1999). 
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